John P. Jordan; David J. Wagstaff, Etc. v. Remco Inc., a Utah copration, et al. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1975
John P. Jordan; David J. Wagstaff, Etc. v. Remco Inc.,
a Utah copration, et al. : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Patrick H Fenton; Attorney for Third Party Plaintiff Respondent.
Carl T Smith; Attorney for Third Party Defendants-Appellants .
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Jordan v. Remco Inc, No. 13690.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1975).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/89
**m»T UUH ****** cou, 
KJCKFT »** 
b'l 'A'l III u r 
JOHN P. JORDAN, 
Plaintiff 
RECEIVED 
.AW LIBRARY, 
IT 
D£C h 1975 
* * # J ••< •1 V0UN6 UNIVERSITY 
.lark Law School 
REMCO, INC., A UTAH CORPORATION, 
'' Defendants and 
Appellants. 
DAVID J. WAGSTAFF, ETC., 
Third Party Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
REMCO, INC., et al., 
Third Party Defendants 
and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
HONORABLE J. HARLAN BURNS, JUDGE 
CARL T. SMITH 
520-26th Street 
Ogden, Utah 844C 
Attorney for T ird Party 
Defendants - A ypellants 
PATRICK H. FENTON 
13 West Hoover Avenue 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Attorney for Third Party Plaintiff 
Respondent Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT .. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE 
DEFENDANT HAD BREACHED THE SUBCONTRACT 
AGREEMENT 3 
POINT II: 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING REMCO'S CLAIM 
OF $20.00 PER DAY FOR TRIANGLE'S FAILURE TO 
CANCEL THE LIEN 5 
POINT III: 
THE COURT ERRED IN DECLARING A FORFEITURE 
IN HOLDING THAT TRIANGLE NEITHER HAD TO 
FINISH THE DRYWALL WORK OR PAY THE AMOUNT 
TO HAVE THE WORK FINISHED OR PAY FOR 
MATERIALS REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE JOB. .. 9 
POINT IV: 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
THERE WAS A WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL WHEN 
TRIANGLE CONTINUED WITH ITS PERFORMANCE 
AFTER THE BREACH OF THE SPECIAL PROVISION 
OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE SUBCONTRACT 
AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDED FOR THE 
PAYMENT OF MATERIALS 10 
POINT V: 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING AN ATTORNEY'S 
FEE TO TRIANGLE AND FAILING TO AWARD AN 
ATTORNEY'S FEE TOREMCO 14 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued 
CONCLUSION 16 
CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES 
Brennan v. White, et al. 97 Michigan 182, 56 NW 354 7,8 
Grayson-McLeod Lumber Co. v. Slack-Kress Tie & Stave 
Co., 102 Ark. 79,143 S.W. 581, 583 13 
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P2d 446 10 
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Hart-
ford Accident & Indemnity Co., 7 Utah 2d 366, 325 P2d 899 14 
Schnepf v. Thomas L. McNamara, Inc., 345 Mich. 393, 93 
NW2d232 ...12 
Shupe v. Menlove, 18 Utah 130, 417P2d246 14,15,16 
Snowball v. Maney Bros & Co., 39 Wyo. 84, 270 P167 13 
Young v. Hansen, 117 Utah 591, 218 P2d 666 9,10 
STATUTES: 
Utah Code Annotated, 38-1-17 15 
Utah Code Annotated, 38-1-18 16 
Utah Code Annotated, 38-1-24 5,17 
TEXTS: 
143 ALR, page 496 . 11 
17 Am Jur 2d, Waiver of Breach; Election to Continue 
Performance, 11,12 
53 Am Jur 2d, Mechancis Liens, 235 6,7 
53 Am Jur 2d, Mechanics Liens, 241 7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN P. JORDON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
REMCO, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
et ah, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
DAVID J. WAGSTAFF, etc., 
Third Party Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
REMCO, INC., etal, 
Third Party Defendants 
and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This case involves a Subcontract Agreement for all 
drywall work on a 60 unit apartment complex constructed 
in Cedar City, Utah, entered into between the third party 
plaintiff, David J. Wagstaff, dba Triangle Drywall 
referred to in this brief as Triangle and the third party 
defendant Remco Inc., referred to in this brief as Remco. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court Judge, J. Harlan Burns, after hearing 
Case No. 
13690 
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the testimony and observing the documents which were 
introduced, awarded judgment for Triangle in the prin-
cipal sum of $4,064.94, interest in the sum of $325.20 plus an 
attorney's fee of $1600.00 for a total judgment of $5,990.14. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment entered 
and that the case be remanded for findings of fact, con-
clusions of law and a judgment which legally corresponds 
to the factual evidence presented and pursuant to the 
argument set forth herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Remco Inc., entered into a subcontract agreement with 
David J. Wagstaff, dba Triangle Drywall on the 19th day of 
May, 1972. Triangle was to do all the drywall work on the 60 
unit apartment complex being constructed by Remco in 
Cedar City, Utah for the sum of $47, 383.00, to be completed 
by August 1, 1972. (Pi's. Ex. 2). 
In preforming the contract, Triangle was falling behind 
in their work as acknowledged by David J. Wagstaff. (Tr. 
32). In an effort to rectify the situation, they assigned a 
portion of the work to Christiansen Drywall, (Tr. 32, 56 and 
57), and to David Cranmer. (Tr. 79). Mr. Richins, who 
represented Remco, made numerous contacts with Mr. 
Wagstaff in an effort to keep the job moving. (Tr. 124 to 135 
and 166). Mr. Sid Miller, the job superintendent, felt he had 
to get the drywall job in progress and therefore hired 
Robert Barwick. (Tr. 65). Finally, on the 1st day of Sep-
tember, Remco was required to step in and finish 
Triangle's job. (Tr. 167).
 9 
Disregarding the monetary value of Remco's work in 
behalf of Triangle in stocking the drywall, (Tr. 82 and R. 
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23), and in cleaning up and hauling trash, (Tr. 83, 85 and R. 
23), the total payments made by Remco to Triangle or in 
their behalf was $49,966.62; the said payments were as 
follows: $4709.00 to James Cody and David Cranmer (Def s 
Exs. 2 and 5); $3458.62 to Christiansen Drywall, to which 
Triangle agreed with $3,144.20 (Tr. 151); $1550.00 to Bobby 
Barwick (Tr. 151) to which Triangle agreed with $900.00 
(Tr. 13); $758.00 to Southern Utah Lumber (Tr. 152), to 
which Triangle agreed with $55.51 (Tr. 47), and $272.65 to 
Iron County Lumber (Tr. 148). The direct payments to 
Triangle or in their behalf to Capitol Supply and the In-
ternal Revenue Service, to which Triangle concurs, were 
$39,218.35 (Def 's Ex. 10 and Tr. 7,46, and 140). 
Triangle placed a lien on the property which was sub-
scribed to on October 5, 1972 for the sum of $13,673.00. 
(Defs Ex. 8). Triangle was informed of Remco's position 
that the lien was wrongfully placed on January 19, 1973. 
(Defs Ex. 17). Triangle refused to release its lien even 
with the payment into court of the full amount of its claim 
(R. 7) and the knowledge that payments to all its suppliers 
and sub-contractors had been made (R. 10). A motion for 
the release of the lien (R. 9) was granted, (R. 11), but 
required placing with the clerk of the court the sum of 
$13,216.61 of Remco's funds. An attempt was made by 
Remco's attorney to place the funds in an interest bearing 
certificate of deposit on the 24th day of September, 1973, 
(R. 19), although this had not been done at the time of the 
dispersal of the funds on January 23,1974. (R. 30). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
THE DEFENDANT HAD BREACHED THE SUB-
CONTRACT AGREEMENT. 
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The sub-contract agreement, (Pis, Ex. 2), provides, 
among other things, as follows: 
"8. Subcontractor agrees to start work May 24, 
1972 with four men, and will keep four to six men 
on project as long as they can be used effectively 
and other crafts do not cause them delays. 
3. Subcontractor shall prosecute his work with due 
diligence so as not to delay the work of Contractor 
or other subcontractors etc. 
1. The agreement between Contractor and Owner 
requires that the work to be performed must be 
completed by August 1, 1972/' 
Triangle failed to comply with the foregoing provisions 
by falling behind in the work as testified to by David J. 
Wagstaff. (Tr. 32). David Cranmer also testified that the 
drywall work was considerably behind \yhen he started 
working in the first part of July. (Tr. 79). Mr. Richins 
contacted Triangle, through Mr. Wagstaff and Mr. Jensen, 
on numerous occasions in an effort to get sufficient men on 
the job to comply with the contract terms, but had little 
success (Tr. 124 to 135). Further efforts to keep the drywall 
work progressing were made by the job superintendent, 
Sid Miller, in hiring Robert Barwick. (Tr. 65). Finally, 
some thirty days after Triangle was to have had the job 
completed, Remco took over the drywall work and paid for 
its completion. (Tr. 167). 
Paragraph 18 of the contract provides: 
" Subcontractor agrees not to sublet, transfer or 
assign this agreement or any part thereof without 
the written consent of contractor.'' 
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Triangle proceeded by subletting work to Christiansen 
Drywall, (Tr. 32,56 and 57), and to David Cranmer. (Tr. 32 
and 73). The obvious reason for having the provision 
against subletting is that without it you lose control of the 
progress and often times the quality of the job, (Tr. 124), 
which is precisely what occurred. 
Triangle was to be paid on the 10th day of each month for 
the previous months work. However, only one bill was ever 
submitted by Triangle and payments were made through 
verbal requests. (Tr. 177). Because of this situation, and 
the levy by the Internal Revenue Service, Mr. Richins had 
certain reservations about paying them. (Tr. 176 and 177). 
Even though the Court construed the contract strongly 
against Remco, (Tr. 183), it is submitted that the strength 
of the construction should not have, been so formidable as 
to withstand the penetration of Triangle's breach, and the 
failure of the Court to so find was error. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING REMCO'S 
CLAIM OF $20.00 PER DAY FOR TRIANGLES 
FAILURE TO CANCEL THE LIEN 
Utah Code Annotated 38-1-24 provides: 
"The claimant of any lien filed as provided herein, 
on the payment of the amount thereof together 
with the costs incurred and the fees for can-
cellation, shall at the request to be cancelled of 
record within ten days from the request, and upon 
failure to so cancel his lien within the time 
aforesaid shall forfeit and pay to the person 
making the request the sum of $20.00 per day until 
the same shall be cancelled, to be recovered in the 
same manner as other debts/' 
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The initial written notification by Remco to Triangle 
tMt fho iTPt» ' hc/been wrongfully placed wae on January 
19, 1973 by letter from Remco's attorney to Triangle's 
attorney with a copy to David J. Wagstaff. (Def's. Ex. 17). 
Remco's attorney, as authorized by Triangle's attorney, 
contacted Mr. Wagstaff directly in the latter part of July 
1973 in an effort to get the lien released upon payment of 
his alleged claim plus 25 Percent, but Triangle refused to 
release lien. (R 7). Remco was then required, by motion 
(R. 9), to get the Court to order the release of the lien 
which was so ordered on the 9th day of August, 1973 upon 
Remco depositing with the Clerk of the Court the sum of 
$13,216 61. (R. 11). 
It is Remco's position that a lien placed for an 
unreasonable amount is just as wrongful as placing a lien 
where it is not justified. Triangles position, which was 
taken by the Court, is that even if only $1.00 was owing the 
lien was proper, and whether the lien was placed for $5.00 
or $50,000.00 the statutory provision became meaningless. 
If Section 38-1-21 is to have any meaning at all, then it 
should be applied in the instant case. 53 Am Jur 2d 
Mechanics Liens, Section 235 deals with this problem in 
stating: 
"Where an overstatement of the amount due and 
sought to be recovered by virtue of a mechanic's 
lien is made intentionally and with a design to 
defraud, it is generally held that the entire lien 
must fail. Such a rule, or a very similar one, is 
expressly stated in some statutes, and in some 
jurisdictions the statutes go beyond this rule and 
additionally provide that the owner may recover a 
civil penalty for wilful exaggeration. 
Even in the absence of a fraudulent purpose, liens 
have been declared void where the claim was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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grossly and intentionally exaggerated, or where 
it was much greater than the claimant honestly 
believed due. Where the claimant asserted a lien 
for more than $5,000 while the court held that only 
some $1,500 was due and unpaid, the amount 
claimed was so excessive as to preclude the 
likelihood of a mistake made in good faith and to 
support a finding that the plaintiff intentionally 
claimed an amount greater than that which was 
justly due him. " 
In Section 241 there is an expression of how the amount 
of the lien is to be determined: 
".While there is some authority that a mechanic's 
lien is valid only to the extent of the actual cost of 
the work and materials used up to the time work 
under the contract was stopped which excludes 
from the lien, profits or prospective profits to the 
contractor, and although, where there has been 
substantial performance of the contract before it 
is terminated, the courts have frequently per-
mitted recovery and a mechanic's lien based on 
the contract price less the cost of completion, a 
great number of cases hold that the reasonable 
value of the work done and materials supplied, 
rather than the actual cost thereof, constitutes the 
amount for which a mechanic's lien may be ob-
tained by a contractor who fails to complete the 
contract work through no fault of his own. In 
some states, statutes limit this rule by providing 
for a reasonable recovery for the work performed 
in proportion to the price for the entire contract. '' 
A statement of the Court in Brennan v. White et al 97 
Michigan 182,56NW354,reflects why the amounts set forth 
on liens must be correct as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"Liens laws are recognized as harsh remedies, 
and when, as by our statute, parties are required 
to file 'just and true statements of the demand 
over and above all legal set-offs, ' equity treats as 
insufficient a statement which is largely ex-
cessive. Parties are not permitted to include 
speculative items in their claims, thereby in-
cumbering the lands of others with untrue and 
unjust claims; and, as the means of information is 
within their reach, they are held to a degree of 
accuracy greater than may be necessary in mere 
actions upon demands.'' 
The instant case represents a situation going beyond the 
actual placement of the lien. In July of 1973, Remco, 
through their attorney, requested that Triangle release its 
lien upon placing $11,522.41 with the Court, (R. 7) which 
was refused. Remco was then required to obtain an order 
of the Court and place $13,216.61 with the Court. (R. 11), 
even though their total claim at that time and at the time of 
trial was $4,064.94. Triangle never did release or cancel the 
lien. Even under these circumstances, Triangle moved to 
reinstate the lien, (R. 15), to which Remco responded. (R. 
16). 
With the lien being placed for an exaggerated amount, 
Triangle refusing to cancel the lien of record upon the 
payment of the amount,with costs incurred and the fees for 
cancellation, and the requirement of placing with the 
Court an amount which was in excess of three times the 
actual claim, the situation represents an abuse for which 
the statute was intended. Not only was there a refusal on 
Triangle's part to cancel the lien, but also the additional 
abuse of requiring the payment of the $13,216.61. 
The minimum amount of time for which Remco should 
be entitled to the $20.00 per day, is from the time of 
refusing to cancel the lien, requiring the order of the Court, 
(R. 11),on August 9,1973, until the parties stipulated to the 
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dispersing of the funds, after the trial, on January 23, 1974, 
This is a period of 152 days for which Remco should be 
entitled to $3040.00 
POINT III 
T H E C 0 U R T E R R E D I N DECLARING A FOR-
FEITURE IN HOLDING THAT TRIANGLE NEITHER 
HAD TO FINISH THE DRYWALL WORK OR PAY THE 
AMOUNT TO HAVE THE WORK FINISHED OR PAY 
FOR MATERIALS REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE 
JOB. 
The Court held that upon the breach by Remco, Triangle 
was entitled to the full contract price but the obligation for 
performance was forfeited. Fortunately for Remco, 
Triangle continued to perform some work and they con-
curred with portions of the payments to Christiansen 
Drywall, Barwick Drywall, and Southern Utah Lumber. 
Remco submits that the Court erred in not accounting for 
the remainder of the Iron County Lumber obligation, 
(Def's Ex. 6) or the Southern Utah Lumber obligation 
(Def s Ex. 6), when the materials could only have been 
used for the drywall job and were delivered to the project. 
(Tr. 76 and 116). The Court in not accounting for the • 
payments made to James Cody and David Cranmer 
(Defs Ex. 2 and 5), resulted in a forfeiture in the amount 
of $4,709.00, although the amount was reasonable to 
complete the job, (Tr. 84, 104, 158, 159, and 160), and 
Remco certainly was not paying gratuities at that point. 
In holding as the Court did, the conclusion is that in any 
contract, if payment is not made on the precise due date, 
the party who has not been paid need no longer perform, 
but is entitled to the full contract price. It is suggested that 
such a conclusion if concurred with by this Court, will lead 
to contractual chaos. 
The entire analysis of this Coui t in "i t n trig t H ai xsei i, 11 7 
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Utah 591, 218 P2d 666, is appropriate in application to the 
present factual circumstances, wherein it was stated: 
"The contract did not provide for retention of the 
money and even if it did, it is questionable that 
such a provision could be enforced, as defendants 
would acquire an unconscionable advantage and 
be unjustly enriched at the expense of plaintiffs as 
there is no showing that defendants have suffered 
any damage. . . .Even though the plaintiff's 
breach is wilful and without semblance of excuse, 
the defendant must restore the excess of benefit 
over harm if, with knowledge that the breach has 
occurred or is impending, he assents to the part 
performance, or retains it or accepts the benefit of 
it unreasonably." 
Even where forfeiture clauses have been involved, this 
Court has not upheld them if the amount involved is 
disproportionate to the damages actually sustained. 
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P2d 446. 
POINTIV 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
THERE WAS A WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL WHEN 
TRIANGLE CONTINUED WITH ITS PERFORMANCE 
AFTER THE BREACH OF THE SPECIAL PROVISION 
OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE SUBCONTRACT 
AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDED FOR THE 
PAYMENT OF MATERIALS. 
The Court held that Remco breached the agreement by 
failing to make the payment as provided in the special 
provision of paragraph 5 (Tr. 183). This was presumably 
breached on the 19th day of June, 1973 which was thirty 
days after the execution of the agreement on the 19th day 
of May 1973. It should be noted, however, that the demand 
by Triangle was $20,000.00 for the sheetrock which ac-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
cording to Mr. Wagstaff cost $14,580.<Mi T* (4 , and ac-
cording to Mr. Richins would cost approximately 
$12,000.00 (Tr. 154). This was of concern to Mr. Richins, 
(Tr. 173), but based on the Court's holding his concern was 
ill-founded. 
'I he specific legal situation where performance is 
continued is covered in 143 ALR at page 496 which states: 
"Ui ider ordinary circumstances, where there is 
an existing actual breach of contract, of a 
character going to the essence, the innocent party 
(having in such case the right to go on with per-
formance, oi to rescind, or to stop performance 
and seek damages as for total breach) will, if he 
insists on performance notwithstanding the 
breach, keep alive his own obligation to continue 
with performance, with the result that the party at 
fault, even though having in the interval done 
nothing in reliance on a continuance of per-
formance, may, if he sees fit, turn about and hold 
the innocent party to performance." 
The waiver aspect of the breach is discussed, in 17 Am 
Jur 2d section 447, entitled waiver of breach; election to 
continue performance. The appropriate language as ap-
plied to the instant case is as follows: 
"Where there has been a material breach which 
does not indicate an intention to repudiate the 
remainder of the contract, the injured party has 
an election of continuing performance, or of 
ceasing to perform, or of repudiating the con-
tract. Any act by the injured party indicating an 
intent to continue will operate as a conclusive 
election, riot depriving him of his right of action 
for the hi each which has already taken place, but 
depriving him of any excuse for ceasing per-
inrnnrco on his own. part. I Jnder ordinary cir-
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cumstances where there is an existing actual 
breach of contract of a character going to the 
essence, the innocent party will, if he insists on 
performance notwithstanding the breach, keep 
alive his own obligation to continue with per-
formance, with the result that the party at fault, 
even though having in the interval done nothing in 
reliance on a continuance of performance, may, if 
he sees fit, turn about and hold the innocent party 
to performance. In other words, a party may 
waive a breach by the other party and then be 
liable for his own subsequent breach. " 
In Schnepfv. Thomas L. McNamara, Inc., 354 Mich. 393, 
93 NW 2d 232, a very similiar factual situation was 
presented to the Court. In holding that the injured party 
had waived its right to terminate the contract the Court 
stated: 
"Did defendant's change of the location for sand 
loading operations constitute a breach of contract 
relieving plaintiff from the obligation to supply a 
sufficient number of trucks at all times? Plaintiff 
continued operations under the written contract 
for a number of days after such change of location 
and up to the April 21 meeting without protest and 
without claiming breach of contract or asserting 
its termination. The record does not indicate that 
he made such claim at any time prior to suit. By 
continuing thus to perform and to accept 
payments under it, as above noted, he lost his 
right, if any, to terminate the contract and declare 
it forfeited. Robinson v. Lake Shore & M.S. 
Railway Co., 103 Mich. 607, 61 N.W. 1014. 
'It was appellant's duty, when it discovered the 
apparent breach of the contract, if it intended to 
insist upon a forfeiture, to do so at once. By per-
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mitting appellees to proceed with the per-
formance of the contract it waived a breach. ' 
Grayson-McLeod Lumber Co. v. Slack-Kress Tie 
& Stave Co ] 02 Ark 79, 143 S.W. 581, 583. 
" Where there has been a material breach which 
does not indicate an intention to repudiate the 
remainder of the contract, the injured party has a 
genuine election either of continuing performance 
oi of ceasing to perform. Any act indicating an 
intent to continue will operate as a conclusive 
election, not indeed of depriving him of a right of 
action for the breach which has already taken 
place, but depriving him of any excuse for ceasing 
performance on his own part. Anything which 
draws on the other party to execute the agreement 
after the default in respect of time or which shows 
that it is deemed a subsisting agreement after 
such default will amount to a waiver.' (Italics 
ours.) 12 Am. Jur. p. 968, s 390." Sinclair Refining 
; Co, v. Costin, Tex. Civ, App,f 116 S.W. 2d 894, 898 " 
A similiar result was reached by the Court in Snowball v. 
Maney Bros. & Co. 39 Wyo. 84, 270 P 167, wherein the Court 
held: 
4
'We do not think that there were two contracts in 
the case at bar, but that all the work by the 
plaintiff was done under the written contract. A 
man cannot blow both hot and cold. He cannot 
treat a contract in force and effect, and then sue 
for its breach, upon the theory that it was 
repudiated by the opposite party. If he acts on the 
theory that it is still in force, the breach, if any, is 
waived/' 
The statement of this Court in Prudential Federal 
Savings & Loan Association v. Hartford Accident & In-
demnity Company, 7 Utah 2d 366, 325 P2d 899, also seems 
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applicable, the statement being: 
"Furthermore, it is a recognized principle of 
contract law that a breach of an insubstantial 
nature, which is severable and does not vitally 
change the transaction, does not release the other 
party completely from performing his obligations 
- under the contract, but gives rise to a right for 
damages for any loss occasioned thereby. " 
The case at hand involved a situation where there was a 
waiver of the breach, although Triangle should have been 
entitled to any damages caused by the breach, if any there 
were. Triangle continued to perform in some sort of 
fashion from the 19th day of June 1973, until approximately 
the 1st of September 1973, when Remco was required to 
step in and complete their job. During this period of time 
they continued to accept payment and made no mention of 
the breach. By waiving the right Triangle may have had, 
they were required to perform pursuant to the contract 
terms, but failed to do so. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING AN AT-
TORNEY'S FEE TO TRIANGLE AND FAILING TO 
AWARD AN ATTORNEY'S FEE TO REMCO. 
On the question of awarding attorney's fees, this Court 
has previously spoken in Shupe v. Menlove, 18 Utah 130, 
417 P2d 246. In that case the parties entered into a contract 
for building a house for cost, plus ten percent. As in the 
present case, as performance continued certain con-
troversies arose regarding the amount of payment for the 
work performed, although the house involved was com-
pleted. The defendant claimed that the total amount owing 
including his ten percent was $49,630.00 The jury awarded 
the sum of $43,000.00 and found that the plaintiff was en-
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titled to an offset of $1,230.22. The claim of Triangle in the 
present case was $13,216.61 and, excluding the interest and 
attorney's fee, they were awarded $4,064.94. Reduced to 
percentages there was a 16 percent differential in the 
Shupecase as compared to a 69 percent differential in the 
present case. The statement of the Court in theShupe case 
which is applicable here is: 
4
 The final claim of error we give attention to is 
the trial court's refusal of defendant's request for 
attorney fees and costs. The pertinent statutes 
are: 
'Section 38-1-17.— As between the owner and the 
contractor the court shall apportion the costs 
according to the right of the case, but in all cases 
each subcontractor exhibiting a lien shall have his 
costs awarded to him, including the co^ts of 
preparing and recording the notice of claim of lien 
and such reasonable attorney's fee as may be 
incurred in preparing and recording said notice of 
claim of lien. 'Section 38-1-18. - In any action 
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the 
successful party shall be entitled to recover a 
reasonable attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court, 
which shall be taxed as costs in this action.' 
(Emphasis added). 
It is plain that these two sections relating to this 
subject should be construed together and that 
when attorney fees are awardable thereunder 
they are to be treated as costs which, as expressed 
in 38-1-17 the court 'shall apportion the costs ac-
cording to the right of the case'. Viewing the 
overall picture of this case in the light most 
favorable to the facts as found by the jury and to 
the verdict and judgment we cannot say that the 
trial court abused its discretion in rejecting 
defendant's contentions." 
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Remco would concede that Triangle was the successful 
party in the matter in the sense that they were awarded 
the full amount they then claimed as due and owing in the 
sum of $4,064.94, but certainly it was substantially dif-
ferent than the claim in August of $13,216.61. However, 
even assuming that the Court made no errors in its fin-
dings, conclusions and judgment, it is submitted that the 
Court did not apportion the costs according to the right of 
the case even in viewing the overall picture of the case in 
the light most favorable to the facts as found by the Court. 
This would certainly be the case if the percentage 
precedent of Shupe v. Menlove is followed. 
CONCLUSION 
The performance of both parties to the sub-contract 
agreement was certainly less than perfect. Remco was 
over a month late in paying the material supplier, 
Triangle failed to keep a sufficient number of men on the 
job to keep up with the other trades, they sublet much of 
their work, and they left the job without completing it. 
Financial problems beset both, so rather than Remco 
making monthly payments as provided in the agreement, 
they were made for the purpose of maintaining Triangle's 
performance. Certainly the evidence establishes a breach 
on the part of Triangle in many aspects of the agreement. 
If Triangle was to have claimed a breach, such action 
should have been taken at the time of such breach, which 
was not done. By continuing to perform, they waived the 
breach and should be held to the damages resulting from 
their non-performance, which damages amounted to 
award granted by the Court plus the payment of $2,583.62 
which was in excess of the contract price, or a total of 
$6,973.56, excluding the attorney's fee award. The total 
amount set forth is also the monetary amount lost by 
Remco when it forfeited its right to performance. Remco 
submits that such a forfeiture is greatly disproportionate 
to the damages actually sustained by Triangle. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
The abuse of the lien law by Triangle should be carefully 
scrutinized by this Court. Under the circumstances which 
existed at the time of filing the lien, for the excessive 
amount indicated, it may have been justified. The real 
abuse came when Triangle refused to cancel the lien some 
ten months later, knowing that all its sublet contractors 
and materialmen had been paid, and knowing that its 
claim was $4,064.94. In requiring them to place $13,216.61 
with the Court, it became an aggravated abuse which 
should not be condoned. This is precisely the type of 
situation where the $20.00 daily penalty, provided for in 
UCA 38-1-24, should apply. 
The aggravated abuse of the lien law as exerted by 
Triangle, should not be considered as the "right of the 
case" as required by statue in determining an award of 
attorney's fees and the award granted by the Court should 
be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CARL T. SMITH 
Attorney for Appellant 
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